Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration 

Ein Teil der an der FSO betreuten Promotion von Fabian Burkhardt ist jetzt bei der Zeitschrift Europe-Asia Studies veröffentlicht worden: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2020.1749566

Abstract
This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders remained. Original data on budget, staff, units, organisational structure and presidential assignments demonstrate that presidential power ought to be conceptualised as a polymorphous phenomenon that varies depending on the level of analysis. Researchers should refrain from over-personalising accounts of authoritarian regimes at the expense of more structural, organisational elements such as ‘institutional presidencies’.