Presidential power and institutional change: A study on the presidency of the Russian Federation

PhD project of Fabian Burkhardt (supervisor: Prof. Heiko Pleines), concluded in 2018

The thesis “Presidential Power and Institutional Change: A Study on the Russian Presidency” challenges the widely-held assumption both with regard to authoritarian regimes in general and Russia in particular that institutions do not matter, and that persons take prevalence over procedures. In the thesis, it is argued that by investigating the presidency instead of presidents, relevant advances can be made both for comparative politics and Russian studies alike. Theoretically, the thesis draws upon three strands of literature: the emerging discipline of comparative presidentialism, recent work on institutions under authoritarianism, and theories of institutional change. The main two concepts are disentangled for further analysis: presidential power is subdivided into institutional, relative and administrative power. Furthermore, a distinction is made between institutional origin and gradual, longitudinal institutional change. This initial stage of concept-building guided the research design of the cumulative dissertation subdivided into three main articles.

The first article¹ revisits theories of institutional origin and provides a novel take on the crafting-process of the 1993 presidency. It is argued that the strict assumptions of rational-choice institutionalism are often hard to meet in reality. Instead of intentional institutional design, the paper conceptualizes designers as do-it-yourself-bricoleurs – craftsmen who work with the ruins of the old system and rearrange and recombine institutional material. Moreover, path dependencies constrain choices of these bricoleurs.

The other two papers explore gradual, slow-moving change in the period between 1994 and 2012. In the second article², an original method based on conventional presidential power indexes is proposed that allows for measuring subconstitutional expansion of presidential power by means of laws, decrees and Constitutional Court rulings. It is argued that this accumulation of powers leads to an institutionalization of relative advantage in favor of the presidency. Expansion, it is shown, occurs more frequently in periods when the political opportunity framework is more pluralistic and competitive. The third article³ attempts to open up the black box of the Kremlin – the presidential administration. In the paper, an analytical framework is employed that has been used to analyze other administrations around the world. By means of the four indicators autonomy, adaptability, complexity and coherence and original data⁴, it is argued that the presidential administration has partially institutionalized over time. Uncertainty was reduced by the stabilization of structures and procedures. On the other hand, patronage and weak compliance with presidential decisions persist. This is called the paradox of power. The main contribution of the thesis and its findings is an attempt to further the integration of authoritarian regimes in general, and Russia in particular, into the emerging paradigm of comparative presidentialism.  
 
1) Do-it-yourself bricoleurs, not engineers!  Revisiting theories of institutional design of the Russian presidency (under review)
 
2) Burkhardt, Fabian. "The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994 - 2012." Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 6 (2017): 472-495.

Link to paper: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1060586X.2017.1388471

Link to online supplementary material: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/1060586X.2017.1388471/suppl_file/rpsa_a_1388471_sm7831.docx
 
3) Burkhardt, Fabian. "Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration." Europe-Asia Studies, online first

Link to paper: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2020.1749566

Link to online supplementary material: https://elib.suub.uni-bremen.de/peid=P00106869
 
4) Burkhardt, Fabian, and Alexander Libman. "The Tail Wagging the Dog? Top-down and Bottom-up Explanations for Bureaucratic Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes", Russian Politics 3, no. 2 (2018): 239-259.

Link to paper: booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/2451-8921-00302005

Link to online supplementary material: https://figshare.com/s/3843d05b7ee2985f2311